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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
1\.\THERINE IRENE DEARDEN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
.\LBERT ERROL DEARDEN, 




NATURE OF THE CASE 
The ease on appeal herein involves a divorce action 
wherein plaintiff sought a decree granting her a divorce 
from defendant and also awarding her the care, custody, 
and control of the minor child of the parties, subject to 
tht.' right of reasonable visitation privileges of defend-
ant, plus alimony and child support in a designated 
amount. Defendant filed a Counterclaim against plain-
tiff seeking against plaintiff the same relief she sought 
:1g-ainst him. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Fifth Judicial District Court (Judge C. Nelson 
Day) g-ranted a deeree of divorce in favor of defendant and 
1 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
against plaintiff and awarding defendant the care, cus-
tody and control of the minor child of the parties with 
the right of reasonable visitation in plaintiff for the rea-
son and on the grounds that the plaintiff is not a fit and 
proper person to have custody of the child and because 
it is in the best interests of the minor child that such a 
judgment be decreed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
The relief sought in this appeal is as follows: 
A. Reversal of the lower Court's decision. 
B. Reversal in part of the lower Court's decision 
and an Order awarding plaintiff the care, custody and 
control of the minor child of the parties, with the right 
of reasonable visitation of defendant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff, Katherine Irene Dearden, age 22 years 
(T-6), and defendant, Albert Erroll Dearden, age 24 
years (T-4) were married on May 26, 1956, at Sugarville, 
Millard County, State of Utah (T-7). One child has been 
born as issue of said marriage, viz. a girl, Julie Kay 
Dearden, age 2 years, having been born on December 24, 
1960 (T-7). At the time of the trial, plaintiff and the 
minor child of the parties were living separate and apart 
from defendant a.t 64 "F" Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Plaintiff was employed as a waitress at the Post House 
Cafe in Salt Lake City. Defendant, who is a truck driver 
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for \Vycoff Company (T-49), was residing with his par-
Pnt~ in Fillmore, Utah. Prior to their separation in Octo-
ht>r, 1 ~Hi~. plaintiff and. defendant lived together with their 
minor child in Fillmore, Utah. 
During the course of the marriage, plaintiff worked 
in order to obtain income for family purposes. :M:ost of 
thi~ employment was as a waitress in Fillmore, Utah 
(T-11, 12, 13, 14). Plaintiff claims that she worked at 
the suggestion and with the acquiescence of defendant 
and because he thought it was best inasmuch as they 
W('l'e getting further in debt (T-32), and defendant ad-
mits that he had no objection to her working (T-70). All 
of the income acquired by plaintiff was used for payment 
of household expenses. 
In October of 1962, plaintiff and defendant separated, 
plaintiff going to Delta, Utah, and then to Salt Lake City 
to seek employment to care for herself and her little 
girl. Defendant remained in Fillmore. 
In November, 1962, plaintiff filed an action in the 
District Court of Millard County seeking a divorce from 
defendant on the grounds of mental cruelty and also 
secki11g to have the permanent custody of the minor 
child awarded to her, subject to the right of reasonable 
visitation of defendant. Defendant Counterclaimed for 
divorce and custody of the minor child. The matter was 
tried before the Honorable C. Nelson Day in the District 
Court of :Jiillard County on April10, 1963, and after tak-
ing the matter under advisement, Judge Day granted 
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defendant a decree of divorce against plaintiff and 
awarded defendant the custody of the minor child, sub-
ject to the right of reasonable visitation of plaintiff. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
GRANT PLAINTIFF A DECREE OF DI-
VORCE AGAINST DEFENDANT AND IN 
GRANTING DEFENDANT A DECREE OF 
DIVORCE AGAINST PLAINTIFF. 
The case before the Court at this time is a divorce 
action involving a dispute between plaintiff and defend-
ant over the permanent custody of Julie Kay Dearden, 
their minor daughter, aged 2 years. Although it is true 
in divorce cases, that the Supreme Court will not disturb 
the trial Court's judgment in the decision of property, 
awards of alimony, and child support unless it appears 
to be unjust and inequitable, Tsoufakis v. Tsoufakis, 
______ Utah ______ , 382, P. 2d 412 (1963), yet the Court may and 
will ·review the facts as well as the law on appeal in 
child custody controversies between divorced parents. 
Sa.m.psell v. Holt, 115 Utah 73, 202 P. 2d 550 (1949), and 
plaintiff prays the Court to review the facts on appeal 
herein and reverse the lower Court on the basis thereof. 
The trial court found as a matter of fact that plain-
tiff "is not entitled to a divorce from defendant upon 
the grounds stated in her Complaint or otherwise." 
(Findings of Fact- P. 8.) In that regard, the grounds 
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for plaintiff'~ Complaint of divorce were acts of mental 
ertwlty committed by defrmlant during the course of the 
ma rringP. Plaintiff testified at the trial, and her testi-
mony was uncontroverted in this, that while she was 
living with defendant and on several occasions, some as 
latt- as October, 1962, defendant (1) told plaintiff to get 
ll divon'P hut she would have to get a lawyer and pay 
t'or it (T-9) - (2) told plaintiff that he had known for 
a long time that the marriage wouldn't work, that he had 
wanted to get rid of her for a long time and that the 
only reason he stayed with her was because he felt he 
was obligated to her (T-9), and defendant testified that 
he does not recall but he may have told plaintiff this 
(T-95, 96) - (3) told plaintiff he didn't care where she 
WPnt or what she did as long as she didn't take the little 
girl with her (T-10) and he didn't want plaintiff around 
(T-10) - ( 4) told plaintiff that he did not want the baby 
(T-10) and that plaintiff should see a psychiatrist (T-10). 
This conduct on the part of defendant during the course 
of the marriage and just prior to the separation of the 
partil's so distressed the plaintiff and caused her such 
mental anguish that she cried on each occasion and she 
was unable to carry on her usual activities because of 
the wa~- defendant's conduct made her feel (T-10). It 
was further testified by plaintiff that the difficulty be-
tween plaintiff and defendant first began approximateJvr 
the time their child was born (T-22), and that it con-
tinued thereafter until the action was filed. Defendant 
asserts that after plaintiff left their home in Fillmore 
and when he took her to the home of her parents in Delta 
that he. defendant, asked Earl Sheehy, plaintiff's father, 
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for advice on the problem that had arisen in the mar-
riage and Mr. Sheehy advised that the young couple get 
away from defendant's parents and make a life for them-
selves (T-87). Defendant, apparently thinking this was 
sound advice, said he had intended to do that but his wife 
left before he could take this action {T-87). Yet, know-
ing that Mr. Sheehy's advice was sound in suggesting 
that plaintiff and defendant get away from the latter's 
parents in order that their difficulties be solved and their 
marriage possibly salvaged thereby, defendant objected 
to plaintiff's wanting to ''get away" for a while to go 
with her parents to Kansas on a vacation in an attempt 
to save the marriage (T-25, 27) 
It was only after the divorce action had been initiated 
in this matter and after the relationship had deteriorated 
beyond recovery that defendant desired to see a marriage 
counselor with plaintiff (T-28). 
While it is true that what constitutes cruelty causing 
mental distress depends upon the facts and circumstances 
of each particular case, Stevenson v. Stevenson, 12 U. 
2d 153, 369 P. 2d 923 (1962), the Courts usually grant 
the wife a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty on 
much less evidence than they do the husband, Doe v. Doe, 
48 U. 200, 212, 158 P. 781, and in dealing with actual cases 
involving cruelty, the courts recognize that the nature 
and disposition of the plaintiff, as well as the conduct of 
the defendant, are important factors. Button v. Button, 
95 Ore. 578, 188 P. 180. It takes a person of very little 
perception to realize that women, generally speaking, 
6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
are much more sensitive about matters of love, marriage, 
and things pertaining to the affections than are men. In 
tlw matter on appeal herein, plaintiff testified that the 
aet ions of her husband caused her mental anguish, that it 
was t4cvere enough to cause her to shed tears and had 
such an effect on her physically that it interfered with her 
normal activit~, of being a wife and mother. Plaintiff 
asserts herein that unless the woman is callous, any 
wife and mother would have reacted as she did if told 
what defendant told plaintiff about his feeling for her 
and the marriage and that such actions are in fact cruel 
treatment causing great mental anguish and grief and 
that, ns plaintiff testified in this matter, defendant's con-
duct did in fact cause her great mental suffering and 
emotional strain because she was interested in saving 
her marriage and holding the family unit intact. 
The Court found from the testimony at the trial of 
this matter that the charges of cruel treatment causing 
mental distress and adultery by plaintiff were sustained 
hy the eYidence. However, plaintiff urges upon this Court 
that such a finding, especially as to adultery, is not justi-
fied from the evidence in this matter. It is true that evi-
dence relating to adultery is nearly always circumstantial 
heenuse the act is generally done in secret and is not 
susceptible to proof; but it is frequently said by the 
Courts that the circumstantial evidence must be of a clear 
and positiYe nature. Marshall Y. Marshall, 3 F. 2d. 344, 
;)5 App. D. C. 173; Brazen v. Brown., 27 Idaho 205, 148 P. 
4J: Diehl Y. Diehl, 87 Pa. Super. 545, and although a clear 
preponderance of the evidence is necessary to establish 
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the act, there is a presumption of innocence on the part 
of the alleged offender and if the party's conduct is open 
to an interpretation of either innocence or guilt, the pre-
sumption of innocence will prevail. Ovenru v. Ovenu,. 201 
Ill. App. 607; Hutzlerv. Hutzler, 161 La. 823,109 So. 504; 
Germarn v. Germ.a(J1;J, 137 Md. 424, 112 A. 789; McCrary v. 
McCrary, 230 S.W. 187 (Tex. Civ. App). To prove adul-
tery circumstantially, as was done in the instant case, it 
is not enough to prove that there was an adulterous dis-
position or that there was an opportunity to commit adul-
tery, but the concurrence of both disposition and oppor-
tunity must be shown. Allen v. Allen, 285 F. 962, 52 App. 
D. C. 228; Grundy v. Grundy,. 92 N. J. Eq. 687, 114 A. 
552; Torrens v. Torren.s, 94 N. J. Eq. 480, 120 A. 189; 
J acobstein. v. J acobstein, 209 App. Div. 846, 204 N.Y.S. 
918, affirmed 240 N.Y. 693, 148 N.E. 761. See also Cooley 
Ca.s. Person.s ood Domestic Relations (2nd Ed.) 142. 
The basis for the Court's finding of adultery on the 
part of plaintiff was the testimony of B. F. Romano of 
Paramount Detective Agency of Salt Lake City who was 
hired by defendant to conduct surveillance activities of 
plaintiff between December 27, 1962, until January 14, 
1963. Mr. Romano, a private detective, testified that 
he and a companion observed plaintiff, Mr. Leo Brunson, 
and plaintiff's apartment continually from the dates 
indicated. The essence of his testimony is that every day 
with the exception of approximately two, plaintiff and 
the said Brunson left her apartment at about 6:30 o'clock 
.a.m. and returned each evening or they would be back 
in the apartment each evening when the detectives re-
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siiiiH'd their surveillance aetivities at about 6:00 o'clock 
p.m. ( '11 -100-1:~~). J\1 r. Romano asserted that he occupied 
an n part nwn t in another building north of plaintiff's 
apart metd: but at about the same height. He asserted 
that he observed the activities of plaintiff and Mr. Brun-
son in the former's apartment with high-powered glasses 
and he could see clearly (T-102) and that he was well 
neq nainted with the layout of the apartment. Yet, under 
cross-t•xnmination, the detective admitted the following 
things about the apartment, the activities of plaintiff and 
Mr. Brunson: 
( 1) That from his observation place he could not see 
the front door of the apartment house in which plaintiff 
lin•<l nor could he see the door that entered into plain-
tiff's apartment (T-100, T-120); 
(2) He could not see the front of the apartment 
honsp at 64 "F" Street (T-118, T-120); 
(3) He did not know there was a back entrance and 
exit to the apartment of plaintiff (T-119) even though 
he rlaimed to have thoroughly acquainted himself with 
tlw apartment house at 64 "F" Street and with plaintiff's 
apartment: 
( 4) He did not know the layout of plaintiff's apart-
ment even though he watched it continually for two 
weeks (T-122); 
( j) That it would have been possible for someone to 
walk out of plaintiff's apartment and out the front door 
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of the apartment house without him or his companion 
having knowledge of it (T-113); 
( 6) He is .not sure that no one entered or left the 
apartment- all he can say is he did not see anyone do 
so (T-123); 
(7) There were two bedrooms in plaintiff's apart-
ment because he could see lights on in both (T-122); 
( 8) He didn't know where the minor child of the 
parties slept (T-123); 
(9) That it is possible that Mr. Brunson could have 
been in the apartment without him knowing it (T-131); 
(10) That he knew where plaintiff's bedroom was 
situated when in fact he didn't know at all (T-104, T-165); 
(11) That he doesn't know or have any idea how 
many times plaintiff left the apartment and entered the 
apartment with the minor child (T-133, 134) yet, this was 
one of the important aspects of his surveillance; 
(12) Although he could see clearly into the apart-
ment he could not tell whether Mr. Brunson was taking a 
bath or shower in the bathroom of plaintiff's apartment 
even though it is usual for one taking a shower to stand 
and for one taking a bath to sit (T-103); 
( 13) Nor could he tell the type or eo lor of clothing 
worn by plaintiff (T-106, T-172); 
10 
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(14) He indicates that plaintiff and Mr. Brunson 
were the sole occupants of the apartment between the 
dates of December 27, 1962- January 14, 1963 (T-97-137), 
yd \[ rs. I\:atherine Sheehy, mother of the plaintiff, was 
in Salt Lake. City between those two dates and stayed 
oven1ight at plaintiff's apartment (T-187) and Detec-
tive Romano did not see her or was not aware of her 
pn•Rcnrc in the apartment, and; 
(1:>) He indicated that he had made a thorough ex-
amination of the back yard at 64 "F" Street and there 
wns no way out in that direction (T-124), when in fact a 
haek way out was in common use at the time by children 
in the neighborhood (T-124, 173). 
It seems apparent that Mr. Romano actually knew 
Y<:ry little about what the physical setup was of plaintiff's 
apartment, or what plaintiff's activities were. He knew 
just as little about the activities of plaintiff and Leo Brun-
son during the two-week period and yet this investigation 
and tesitmony was crucial in establishing by a clear pre-
ponderance of the evidence the act of adultery by plain-
tiff. The inconsistencies a.nd lack of knowledge and un-
derstanding in the detective's testimony is apparent and 
this, coupled "·ith the fact that the evidence of hired de-
tectives will be subject to careful scrutiny by the Courts, 
since the detectives may be prejudiced in favor of prov-
ing what they are employed to prove, Sargent v. Sargent, 
114 ..:\. 428 (N. J. Ch.); Fontana v. Fontana, 182 App. 
Div. 117, 170 NYS. 308; Steele v. Steele, 170 N.Y.S. 454; 
Steu·art v. Stewart, 85 Pa.. Super. 39; Ovenu v. Ovenu, 
11 
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Supra; German v. German, Supra; Diehl v. Diehl, Supra, 
leaves one with no alternative but to cast serious doubt 
upon the reliability of the detective's testimony. 
On the basis of the testimony and the evidence in 
the record, plaintiff urges that as far as the adultery find-
ing is concerned, that the evidence is reasonably suscep-
tible to interpretation as to her guilt or innocence in that 
there were two bedrooms in her apartment and it is rea-
sonable to find that Mr. Brunson slept in a bedroom other 
than the one occupied by plaintiff; it is entirely reason-
able to conclude that Mr. Brunson left the apartment un-
seen by Mr. Romano and his companion, and inasmuch 
as the detectives claimed they could see clearly into plain-
tiff's apartment yet they could not see clearly enough to 
ascertain whether Mr. Brunson was taking a shower or 
a bath, showing that their view into the apartment was 
anything but clear, and inasmuch as plaintiff's conduct 
is open either to an interpretation of guilt or innocence, 
the presumption of innocence prevails and the Court 
should order the striking of the finding of adultery and 
hence that of cruelty. It should he noted here that plain-
tiff has consistently denied that she and Mr. Brunson ever 
committed the act of adultery. 
However, even if it is believed that plaintiff did in 
fact commit adultery, it should be noted by this Court 
that on the basis of the record such act would have oc-
curred sometime between December 27, 1962, and Jan-
uary 14, 1963. Not that any such act is ever justified, 
but as far as this action is concerned and using such con-
duct of plaintiff by defendant as grounds for divorce as 
12 
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(·aw-:ing- him gr<>at emotional distn'ss, anguish, and upset, 
it should be pointed out and considered by this Court 
that such action occurred at a time when the marriage 
ltnd, for all intents and purposes, ended and the relation-
ship hdwt't'll plaintiff and defendant was beyond saving 
st•n•ra 1 months before, and that the prior conduct of de-
femlnnt toward plaintiff was undoubtedly a factor in 
bringing about plaintiff's later conduct. Certainly, de-
fendant felt that the marriage was ended long before the 
deerPP of divorce was granted by Judge Day on April19, 
I !)(i:~, because l\Ir. Dearden did not think it improper to 
date a young lady from Richfield at least 6 weeks before 
the trial of the divorce action. 
It should also be pointed out with some emphasis and 
gin.•n due consideration by this Court that plaintiff had 
been encouraged by defendant and led by necessity to 
work in order to meet the family obligations and to 
acquire a home with the furniture, fixtures, and effects 
}Wrtinent thereto; and that defendant, during the course 
of the marriage, drove a truck on the Fillmore-St. George 
and Fillmore-Salt Lake runs and by reason of their both 
\Hnking, the parties did not spend much time together 
nor did they see each other very often. None of these 
rirrumstances may be a justification for the conduct of 
either party, but they do point out possible and maybe 
probable reasons for the deterioration of this marriage 
starting with the birth of the child until its culmination 
with this divorce action. 
Other than the adultery allegedly and supposedly 
rommitted during December and January, the only tes-
13 
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timony relating to misconduct during the time that the 
marriage was supposed to be valid and effective was 
that of Kenneth William Brunson (T-143-149), wherein 
he claimed to have discovered plaintiff and Leo Brunson 
in the basement of the Cafe Ilene during the deer hunt 
which would have been in Octo her or November of 1962. 
However, the evidence was uncontroverted that Mrs. 
Dearden was not employed there at that time and hadn't 
been for some six weeks to two months prior to that time. 
The occasion related by the witness seems either to have 
been a figment of his own imagination or that of someone 
else's imagination which he brought into court and relat-
ed by rote to assist the defendant in this matter. A read-
ing of that portion of the transcript relating to this wit-
ness's testimony reveals that he did not know what he 
was talking about and that the obtaining of such a wit-
ness to testify on behalf of the defendant for the sole 
purpose of injurying the plaintiff should cast some se-
rious doubts on every aspect of the defendant's case. 
On the basis of the record and transcript in this mat-
ter, the argument set forth in this Brief, the cases cited 
therein, and upon the equities in this matter, plaintiff 
prays that the decree of the trial court be reversed and 
that it be ordered that plaintiff be granted a decree of 
divorce in her favor and against defendant as per her 
Complaint heretofore filed in the District Court. 
POINT II. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ITS FAlL-
URE TO GRANT PLAINTIFF THE CUSTODY 
14 
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OF THE :MINOR CHILD OF THE PARTIES 
SUBJECT TO DEFENDANT'S RIGHT OF 
REASONABLE VISITATION . 
. 
Plaintiff incorporates into Point II the facts, law, 
mHl argument set forth in Point I herein, and especially 
the portion relating to the Court's finding of adultery. 
The Trial Court's finding in relation to the custody 
of the minor child is as follows: "lla. That plaintiff is 
and has been a neat and orderly housekeeper and there is 
no evidence that she has directly or intentionally mis-
treated the child. That on the other hand her actions and 
treatment of the child have not been for its best interests 
or welfare.'' 
The finding under paragraph 15 was that defendant 
\Yas a fit and proper person to have custody of the child 
and that plaintiff was not and that the best interests of 
the child required that she be given to defendant in order 
that his parents could keep her. 
It is significant to review the uncontroverted evi-
dence in the transcript relating to plaintiff's care and 
treatment of the child, her love for it and the child's love 
for her mother and the environment of the child in the 
apartment of the plaintiff. The testimony shows that dur-
ing the course of the marriage, defendant chided plaintiff 
for the way she cared for the child because he thought 
his wife spent too much money on keeping the little girl 
clothed. Defendant's mother testified that she was sure 
the little girl loved her mother and that plaintiff loved 
the child and that the last information she had plaintiff 
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was a wonderful mother and housekeeper (T-159). Kath-
erine Sheehy, mother of plaintiff, said that her daughter 
was a good housekeeper and mother, that she loved her 
child and that the child wants to he with her mother 
(T-189). Rosalie Phillips, an acquaintance of plaintiff's, 
asserted that plaintiff is an immaculate housekeeper and 
that Julie, her little girl, means more to her than any-
thing else in the world (T-191, 192). The testimony of 
Cherie Watts is essentially the same as the others (T-193, 
194, 195), as is that of Dorothy Carter who testified that 
she thought it would be in the best interests of the child 
to remain with her mother (T-196, 197) as did Jeri 
Sheehy ( T -195, 196). There is, of course, the testimony 
of plaintiff that she loves her child and desires to have 
her and that the little child loves her mother. On the 
other hand, we find that the father has so little con-
cern for his little daughter that he did not take or send 
her any birthday gift nor did he take her any Christmas 
gift, even though he knew that the child was in Delta and 
he went there to deliver gifts to friends. Mr. and Mrs. 
Dearden, the mother and father of defendant, who both 
profess to love Julie Dearden as one of their own, could 
not :find the time or did not :find it to delight the little 
two-year-old with a present from grandmother and 
grandfather at Christmas time (T-156-163). The find-
ing then that plaintiff was not a :fit and proper person to 
have custody of the child could not have been based upon 
any neglect of the plaintiff for her failure to provide for 
her physical needs or for love and affection because the 
record shows the contrary. The only other reason for her 
unfitness would have to he the alleged adultery. 
16 
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Plaintiff testified that while she occupied the apart-
nwnt at (i-! "F'' Street in Salt Lake City, her child, who 
wa~ t't•d, bathed and put to bed after she returned home 
t•aeh nig-ht, slept in a crib in a separate room with the door 
clmwd (T-167). Based on all the testimony taken at the 
trial then• is no evidence that plaintiff was immoral or 
indi~ereet in the presence of the child or in the sight of 
t hL' child unless, as the court said in Smith v. Smith, 9 U. 
:!d L)7, 159 (1959) it be immorality or indiscretion to 
permit a man to visit her after the marriage for all in-
tents mHl purposes was an impotent and ended circum-
~tanee. And as the court said further, 
\Ve think such visitation without any further evi-
dence of any indiscretion indulged in the presence 
or sight of her children, cannot brand her as being 
an unfit mother to have custody of her own chil-
d n'll, and absent such evidence, the presumption 
that she was a fit and proper person calls upon us 
to send this case back with instructions to enter a 
finding of fact to the effect that plaintiff here is a 
fit and proper person to have custody under the 
conditions of the decree as we have construed it. 
A further examination of the transcript fails to indi-
cate that if plaintiff were indiscreet or immoral she in-
tends to be so in the presence or sight of her child. 
The law seems to be that a divorced mother has no 
n bsolute right to custody of minor children, but that all 
things being equal, preference should be given to the 
mother in awarding custody of a child of tender years, 
notwithstanding the divorce is granted to the father. 
Stcipcr Y. Steiger, 4 U. 2d 273, 293 P. 2d 418 (1956). In 
that case, defendant husband was awarded a decree of 
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divorce on the grounds of mental cruelty and was also 
awarded temporary custody of the three-year-old boy of 
the parties. On appeal it was held that evidence that 
plaintiff wife drank intoxicating liquor two or three times 
to a point of intoxication, that she frequently was seen 
with a man other than her husband, and that she was not 
a good housekeeper failed to establish that she was unfit 
to have the custody of the three-year-old child of the par-
ties, and especially where such evidence came from de-
fendant husband's witness and where it appeared that 
plaintiff's love for the child had caused her to work to 
provide for him, had caused her to spend her free time 
with him and had caused her to fight for his custody. 
One of the chief complaints of defendant in the in-
stant case is that Julie Dearden was shuttled around to 
babysitters because plaintiff had to work to provide for 
her and how much better off the child would be with 
his parents. However, plaintiff's fitness to have the child 
is revealed in her working to provide for the minor, the 
spending of her free time with the baby and the fight 
plaintiff is putting up for custody. As the court said in 
Briggs v. Briggs, 111 U. 418, 181 P. 2d 223 (1947), ordi-
narily no one can take the place of a mother in the life of 
a girl of that age. 
The cases are unanimous in declaring that a child 
of tender years should he awarded to its divorced mother 
unless she is grossly immoral or subjects the child to 
abuse or gross neglect, provided she is in other respects 
at least a fairly good parent. Phillips v. Phillips, 175 Or. 
14, 149 P. 2d 967; Richardson v. Richardson, 182 Or. 141, 
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186 P. 2d 398, and further that the custody of little girls 
should not be taken from their mother in a divorce suit 
t>X<'l'pt for the most cogent reasons. Claude v. Claude, 180 
Or. 62, 17-!: P. 2d 179. 
At least one court has said that infatuation with a 
man other than her husband, and even adultery, if not 
promiscuous, does not necessarily mean that a mother 
should be deprived of the custody of a child of tender 
years. Martin v. Martin, 27 Wash. 2d 308, 178 P. 2d 284 . 
. \nd it 'vas said in 1Yilson v. Wilson, 199 Or. 263, 260 P. 
~d 952, that moral unfitness within the rule that a child 
of tender years should be awarded to the custody of its 
mothC'r, notwithstanding she is the losing party in a di-
\'orre action, unless she is morally unfit, must be such as 
to luwe n direct bearing upon the welfare of the child, and 
the test is whether the mother's conduct is so depraved, 
immoral, and wicked that to permit her child to remain 
in her custody would be injurious to the best interests of 
the child. In this same vein, see also Leverich v. Lever-
irh, 175 Or. 174, 152 P. 2d 303. 
Plaintiff denies that she has had any sexual rela-
tionship with any man other than her husband and as 
indicated herein the presumption of innocence in that 
reg-ard should be applicable. However, even if the court 
belien's that there is no question that plaintiff has com-
mitted adultery as claimed by defendant, there is no jus-
tification for holding that the commission of that act alone 
has had any injurious affect on the child or its welfare. 
A far more important consideration it seems is that the 
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alleged conduct of plaintiff that is supposedly contra to 
the best interests and welfare of the child supposedly 
occurred on December 1962 and January 1963. There is 
absolutely no evidence of any misconduct on the part of 
plaintiff thereafter and, in fact, plaintiff specifically de-
nies having even seen Leo Brunson for a month before the 
trial and that she did not know of his whereabouts 
(T-178). Mr. Romano indicates that he saw plaintiff 
and Mr. Brunson together in an automobile in Salt Lake 
City on March 31. Again, even if it is believed that plain-
tiff did in fact ride with Mr. Brunson on the date indi-
cated, it may well have been an indiscreet thing to do, as 
was her other conduct, but certainly it does not show that 
she has committed adultery or that she is so morally 
depraved that her conduct is injurious to the welfare of 
her child. 
The question of the fitness of the parent to have cus-
tody of a minor child refers to his or her fitness at the 
time of hearing and one court has held that misconduct 
of the wife that took place after the parties had sepa-
rated and after the commencement of the divorce action 
was immaterial to the determination of the issue of 
whether such misconduct rendered her unfit to have cus-
tody of a minor child. Revier r. Revier, 48 Wash. 2d 231, 
292 P. 2d 861. Certainly there has been no showing that 
in February, March, or April plaintiff was guilty of the, 
misconduct she was accused of having committed in De-
cember and J anua.ry and there is no showing or reason 
tp infer that if she was guilty of the misconduct in Jan-
uary she would continue to be. 
20 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
It seems that the reason defendant thinks that plain-
tiff i~ unfit to have custody of the child is that the little 
.~i rl had to be tended by a babysitter during the day 
while the mother worked. This, we think, is no basis for 
unfitness been mw it relates to plaintiff's financial status 
and that alone is not sufficient to justify an award of 
<'ll~tody. lVhite v. White, 160 Kan. 32, 159 P. 2d 461; 
Jo·nes v. Jones, 23 Wash. 2d 657, 161 P. 2d 890. Appar-
ently, what is required for the best interests of the minor 
iH not the ideal situation, but after a balancing of many 
fad or~, what then will be for the child's best interest. The 
factors generally considered are reasonable permanency 
of address, opportunity to develop friendships, school-
mates and playmates, and continued attendance at acces-
8ihle schoolR, churches and recreational facilities. Emer-
son v. Quinn, 79 Idaho 358, 317 P. 2d 344; Briggs v. 
U ripqs, supra. 
The child in the instant case is so young that at this 
tinw the usual considerations are not quite so important 
as that of the child being with her mother, and the im-
portant factor here is that the minor is a little girl, two 
~-('ars of age, who at this point needs the care, attention, 
and affection of her mother and from every indication 
shr has received that from plaintiff and will continue 
to do so. 
To deprive plaintiff of the custody of this child un:der 
the facts of this c.ase is to punish plaintiff for past con-
duct and hence is punishment for the child. Nye v. Nye, 
411 Ill. 408, 105 N.E. 2d 300. 
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As the Courts have said in wrestling with child 
custody in divorce actions, the child's welfare and not the 
shortcomings of the parent is determinative of right of 
custody. Newell v. Newell, 146 Cal. App. 2d 166, 303 P. 
2d 839; and again, custody of children in divorce cases 
must always be determined upon the basis of the chil-
dren's welfare and cannot he used as a means of punish-
ment or reward of either parent. KalotttSek v. Kalousek, 
77 Idaho 433, 293 P. 2d 953. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant urges upon the Court that based upon the 
testimony at the trial of the divorce action defend-
ant did in fact treat plaintiff in a cruel manner causing 
her great emotional upset and the defendant's conduct led 
to the separation of the parties and the ultimate dissolu-
tion of their marriage relationship. The finding of com-
mission of the act of adultery by plaintiff is not supported 
by the evidence and after viewing the evidence most fa-
vorable to defendant and against plaintiff on that point, 
at the very least the evidence is susceptible of a finding 
of either guilt. or innocence on the part of plaintiff and 
hence the presumption of her innocence must prevail, and 
that the lower court's judgment granting defendant a 
decree of divorce in his favor and against plaintiff should 
be reversed. 
Probably the most important aspect of the case on 
review is the custody of Julie Dearden, the minor child of 
the parties. After all is said, plaintiff desires that the 
custody of the minor child be awarded to her, subject to 
the right of reasonable visitation privileges of defendant. 
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Plaintiff loves the child and always has and will always 
do so. She not only desires to have the child awarded to 
itPr, but she needs to have the child as this little girl of 
tPmler years needs to be with her mother to be cared for 
by her and to receive the love and affection that plaintiff 
has for her child and that plaintiff has always been free 
to bestow on her. 
Julie Dearden is at an age where she needs the care, 
comfort, and love of her mother more than she needs 
many of the more desired material things of life. But 
sinre it is difficult to see the yearning and desire of a 
two-year-old girl for the companionship of her mother 
nnd it is easy to see a new dress or a bright shiny pair 
of shoes, often the former is not given its proper weight 
in considering the matter. It is better for Julie Dearden 
to be with her mother who loves her and wants her in the 
home she provides for her than to be with the grandpar-
ents in their spacious home in Fillmore. 
Appellant respectfully prays and requests the Court 
to reverse in part the trial Court's decision and to award 
plaintiff the custody of the minor child, subject to the 
right of defendant to reasonable visitation of his 
daughter. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KIPP AND CHARLIER 
D. GARY CHRISTIAN 
516 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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